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INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued
thirteen precedential opinions in the area of government contracts law.
Seven of these decisions consisted of bid protests appealed from the
Court of Federal Claims, making 2018 the “year of the protest,” at least
in terms of the Federal Circuit’s government contracts jurisprudence.
Four decisions concerned contractual disputes arising under the
Contract Disputes Act1 (CDA) regime, and the remaining two decisions
addressed the scope of the Court of Federal Claims’s jurisdiction to hear
non-CDA contractual disputes pursuant to the Tucker Act.2
Before diving into the individual decisions, it is perhaps worth
reiterating that government contracts cases have always been a small
portion of the Federal Circuit’s overall docket. Indeed, in a court
1. Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–09).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
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that was created primarily to “address the burgeoning federal litigation
and inter-circuit splits in the area of patent law,” government contracts
law issues rarely take center stage.3 The passage of the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act4 (AIA) and the resulting surge of appeals from the
newly-formed Patent Trial and Appeal Board have further increased the
percentage of the court’s docket that is taken up by patent issues.5
According to annual data published by the court, the number of appeals
in the area of intellectual property has risen from forty-seven percent of
the court’s docket in fiscal year 2012 to about sixty-five percent in fiscal
year 2017.6 In contrast, only about four to five percent of the court’s
appeals have related to contract law during this same period.7 This
generally translates to between ten and twenty precedential opinions
each year on government contracts issues.8
It is therefore difficult for the Federal Circuit judges to develop a
significant body of expertise and jurisprudence on government
contracts law issues. As noted by the Honorable Jimmie V. Reyna and
Nathaniel E. Castellano in a 2016 article about successful government
contracts advocacy before the Federal Circuit:
These statistics suggest that the Federal Circuit has relatively few
opportunities to issue precedential opinions that can meaningfully
contribute to and shape the contours of government contracts law.
They also suggest that there are not enough government contracts
cases appealed to the Federal Circuit for the judges, much less
their clerks, to develop and maintain a high level of working
knowledge in all aspects of the law of government contracting.9

3. Collin D. Swan, Government Contracts and the Federal Circuit: A History of Judicial
Remedies Against the Sovereign, 8 J. FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y 105, 114 (2014).
4. Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35
U.S.C.) (AIA).
5. See, e.g., Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act:
Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 435–36 (2012) (describing the substantial impact of
the AIA on patent litigation).
6. Compare UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, APPEALS
FILED, BY CATEGORY: FY 2012, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/thecourt/statistics/Caseload_by_Category_Appeals_Filed_2012.pdf (last visited May 20,
2019), with UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, APPEALS
FILED, BY CATEGORY: FY 2017, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/thecourt/statistics/FY_17_Filings_by_Category.pdf (last visited May 20, 2019).
7. Id.
8. Dennis J. Callahan et al., 2017 Government Contract Law Decisions of the Federal
Circuit, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1274 (2018).
9. Jimmie V. Reyna & Nathaniel E. Castellano, Successful Advocacy in Government Contracts
Appeals Before the Federal Circuit: Context is Key, 46 PUB. CONT. L.J. 209, 209–10 (2016).
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Professor Steven L. Schooner noted such a trend in his 2010 review
of the Federal Circuit’s government contracts cases.10 He examined
the judges’ level of participation in government contracts cases
during 2010 and concluded that “no judge participated in ten, and
the vast majority of judges participated in fewer than half a dozen,
government contracts related matters.”11 Eight years later, Professor
Schooner’s observations continue to be on point12:

10. Steven L. Schooner, A Random Walk: The Federal Circuit’s 2010 Government
Contracts Decisions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1067, 1069–72 (2011).
11. Id. at 1071.
12. Of course, as previously noted by Professor Schooner, case selection
methodology is not always consistent. The above table includes only appeals that
resulted in precedential published opinions. The Authors also decided not to
include the Federal Circuit’s decision in Moda Health Plan, Inc. v. United States, which
addressed certain contractual claims but was largely related to the government’s
decision to stop making risk corridor payments to health insurance companies under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 892 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
2018). The Authors included two other decisions in the above table that are not
discussed in the Article. The first, FastShip, LLC v. United States, involved a patent
infringement suit against the United States in connection with the U.S. Navy’s
development and production of its Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ships. See 892 F.3d
1298, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The second, Starry Associates, Inc. v. United States,
followed a successful post-award bid protest and addressed the scope of the “special
factor” exception to the statutory cap to receive attorney fees under the Equal Access
to Justice Act. See 892 F.3d 1372, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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DISSENTING
DECISION

Lee et al.

Each active judge sitting on the Federal Circuit participated in at
least one government contracts case in 2018 that resulted in a
published opinion. Chief Judge Prost and Judge Wallach were the
most involved in this year’s set of government contracts opinions,
having each participated in six cases and each authoring three
opinions (not including Judge Wallach’s dissent of the court’s denial of
a petition for rehearing en banc in Cleveland Assets LLC v. United States13).
Hence, the dearth of government contracts cases before the
Federal Circuit means that advocates often face a “dauntingly difficult
task” of conveying their points on “complex issues to an audience that
may have no direct experience grappling with the particular issues on
appeal and may even lack a taste for procurement flavored fare.”14
The Federal Circuit may issue a limited number of government
contracts decisions each year, but as this year’s decisions show, the
court continues to serve as the de facto court of last resort on many
issues facing the government contracts community.15 The court’s
13. 897 F.3d 1332, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Wallach, J., dissenting).
14. Reyna & Castellano, supra note 9, at 211. For a discussion of how the
government contracts community could assist the court in developing its government
contracts jurisprudence by increasing the use of amicus briefs, see Jayna Marie Rust,
Note, How to Win Friends and Influence Government Contracts Law: Improving the Use of
Amicus Briefs at the Federal Circuit, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 185, 187 (2012).
15. See, e.g., Ruth C. Burg, The Role of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
in Government Contract Disputes: A Historic View from the Bench, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 173,
183 (2012) (“The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to decide appeals relating
to the contracts of the United States Government and, because Supreme Court
review is rare, is effectively ‘the court of last resort’ for government agencies and
their contractors.”); Richard C. Johnson, Beyond Judicial Activism: Federal Circuit
Decisions Legislating New Contract Requirements, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 69, 71 (2012)
(“[B]ecause appeals on certiorari from the [Federal Circuit] to the Supreme Court
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decisions are thus often significant and have wide-ranging implications
that every government contracts practitioner should consider.
I. BID PROTEST CASES
A. Dell Federal Systems, L.P. v. United States
In Dell Federal Systems, L.P. v. United States,16 the Federal Circuit
addressed the proper legal standard for reviewing the scope of an
agency’s decision to take corrective action when faced with a
protest.17 In particular, the Federal Circuit reversed a line of cases at
the Court of Federal Claims that had previously required agencies to
“narrowly tailor” their corrective action to the identified
procurement errors.18 The Federal Circuit instead applied the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and held that an agency’s corrective action
requires only a “rational basis” to be upheld.19 As discussed below,
this decision may significantly impact bid protest litigation.
1.

Background
In May 2016, the U.S. Army solicited proposals for indefinite
delivery, indefinite quantity contracts to procure approximately $5
billion worth of commercial off-the-shelf computers and other related
equipment over a ten-year period.20 The contracts were to be
awarded to the lowest priced technically acceptable offerors.21 Fiftyeight contractors bid for the contract, but only nine were considered
technically acceptable.22 All nine contractors were awarded contracts,
causing a total of twenty-one disappointed bidders to file bid protests
at the Government Accountability Office (GAO).23
In response to the protests, the Army acknowledged the existence
of procurement errors, including ambiguities in the solicitation and
the Army’s decision not to conduct discussions with offerors despite a

are as rare as hens’ teeth, the [Federal Circuit] has in effect become the court of last
appeal in government contract cases.”).
16. 906 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
17. Id. at 991–94.
18. Id. at 993.
19. Id. at 992, 994–96.
20. Dell Fed. Sys., L.P. v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 92, 97 (2017).
21. Id. at 98.
22. Id. at 96.
23. Id.
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regulatory requirement to do so.24 The corrective action involved:
“(1) opening discussions with all of the remaining offerors, including
those who filed protests, (2) requesting final revised proposals, and (3)
issuing a new award decision.”25 The Army also decided to release an
anonymized list of all the proposed prices from the original procurement
so that the original awardees would not be at a competitive disadvantage.26
Dell Federal Systems and Blue Tech Inc., along with five other
awardees, challenged the scope of the Army’s corrective action in the
Court of Federal Claims.27 Judge Wheeler found in favor of the
awardees and imposed a permanent injunction against the Army.28
Relying on its own precedent under Amazon Web Services, Inc. v. United
States,29 the court reasoned that the Army’s corrective action was not
“narrowly tailored” to the defects in the Army’s procurement.30 The
court stated, “[e]ven where an agency has rationally identified defects
in its procurement, its corrective action ‘must narrowly target the
defects it is intended to remedy.’”31
2.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
The Army, along with several protesters, appealed to the Federal
Circuit, which reversed the Court of Federal Claims’s decision. In an
opinion authored by Judge Wallach and joined by Judge Moore and
Senior Judge Schall, the Federal Circuit rejected the lower court’s
“narrowly tailored” analysis under Amazon Web Services as contrary to
the court’s own precedent and inconsistent with the arbitrary and
capricious standard under the APA.32
The Federal Circuit criticized the lower court’s reliance on its own
precedent, stating, “[T]he Court of Federal Claims must follow
relevant decisions of the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, not
the other way around.”33 In asserting its disapproval of the lower
24. Id. at 99 (“For acquisitions with an estimated value of $100 million or more,
contracting officers should conduct discussions.” (quoting the Department of
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement § 215.306(c)(1))).
25. Dell Fed. Sys., L.P. v. United States, 906 F.3d 982, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
26. Id. at 989.
27. Dell Fed. Sys., 133 Fed. Cl. at 100.
28. Id. at 107.
29. 113 Fed. Cl. 102 (2013).
30. Dell Fed. Sys., 133 Fed. Cl. at 104–06.
31. Id. at 104 (quoting Amazon Web Servs., 113 Fed. Cl. at 115).
32. Dell Fed. Sys., L.P. v. United States, 906 F.3d 982, 986, 993–94 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
33. Id. at 992 (quoting Dellew Corp. v. United States, 855 F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed.
Cir. 2017)).
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court’s analysis, the Federal Circuit cited precedent showing that it
had “consistently reviewed agencies’ corrective action under the
APA’s ‘highly deferential’ ‘rational basis’ standard.”34 The Federal
Circuit explained that while the Court of Federal Claims attempted to
frame its standard with rationality and reasonableness, it had actually
applied a heightened, “narrowly targeted” standard.35 This heightened
standard was against the precedent of not only the Court of Federal
Claims but also the Federal Circuit.36 According to the Federal Circuit,
by asking whether a remedy to an identified error in the bidding process
was as narrowly tailored as possible, the Court of Federal Claims
incorrectly applied an overly stringent test for corrective action.37
The awardees argued that the “narrowly targeted” requirement
applied by the Court of Federal Claims should not be viewed as a
separate standard, but instead, should be viewed as an application of
the “rational basis” standard.38 The Federal Circuit rejected the
argument, stating that a “narrowly targeted” standard was not found
in either the statute or its own precedent.39 The APA requires an
agency to show that it “provided a coherent and reasonable
explanation of its exercise of discretion.”40 According to the Federal
Circuit, the “narrowly targeted” standard applied by the Court of
Federal Claims in this case would undermine the deferential standard
that an agency is entitled to under the APA.41
The Federal Circuit also rejected the awardees’ argument that the
Army’s decision to release all offered prices from the original
procurement put the awardees at a competitive disadvantage. First,
the Federal Circuit found no binding authority that would prohibit
the Army’s disclosure of the pricing from all offerors.42 In addition, it
found that the Army had a reasonable explanation for releasing the
pricing information.43
The Federal Circuit also accepted the
government’s conclusion that upon rebidding, the release of pricing

34. Id. (quoting Croman Corp. v. United States, 724 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
35. Id. at 992.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 992–93.
38. Id. at 993.
39. Id. at 994.
40. Id. (quoting Banknote Corp. of America, Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
41. Dell Fed. Sys., 906 F.3d at 994.
42. Id. at 997.
43. Id.
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information would actually help those offerors who did not put forth
the lowest price.44 During the rebidding process, those offerors now had
the chance to revise their proposals and fairly compete with other offerors.45
The Federal Circuit’s explicit rejection of the lower court’s use of
the “narrowly tailored” standard means that initial awardees and
other potential contractors unhappy with an agency’s decision to take
corrective action will be unlikely to obtain relief unless they can
demonstrate that the agency failed to act with a rational basis.
The practical impact of this decision on bid protest litigation may
be quite significant for at least three reasons. First, the Court of
Federal Claims’s “narrowly tailored” standard deviated from the
highly deferential standard used by GAO to review the
reasonableness of agency corrective action plans.46 Therefore, the
Federal Circuit’s decision in Dell Federal brings further harmony to
the legal standards applied by GAO and the Court of Federal Claims.
Second, the Court of Federal Claims’s decisions reviewing challenges
to agency corrective action plans were not uniform in their
application of the “narrowly tailored” standard. Some cases seemed
to strictly apply the “narrowly tailored” standard, limiting the
permissible scope of agency corrective action, while other cases were
more deferential. By rejecting the “narrowly tailored” line of cases
and confirming that the highly deferential APA standard applies, the
Federal Circuit’s decision may reduce uncertainty in this area of
procurement law in favor of uniformly deferential review. Third, and
perhaps most significantly, agencies facing protests and weighing the
potential costs and benefits of corrective action previously had to
consider the risk that their corrective action would immediately
trigger another round of protest litigation and additional
procurement delays. The Federal Circuit’s clear pronouncement that
corrective action is subject to deferential APA review, and not any
“narrowly tailored” standard, may provide agencies more certainty and
maneuverability in their protest response and corrective action
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., CSRA LLC, B-415171.3, at 4–5 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 27, 2018)
(identifying the “broad discretion” agencies have to make corrective action decisions
in terms of negotiated procurements); Computer Assocs. Int’l Inc., B-292077.2, at 5
(Comp. Gen. Sept. 4, 2003) (asserting that agencies have the discretion to decide the
scope of proposed revisions); SMS Data Prods. Grp., Inc., B-280970.4, at 2 (Comp.
Gen. Jan. 29, 1999) (adding that agency discretion has the purpose of ensuring fair
and impartial competition).
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strategies. This flexibility is particularly important in light of recent
calls for protest reform. These calls emerge from perceived concerns
that serial protests could threaten to paralyze the acquisition process.47
B. Palantir USG, Inc. v. United States
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Palantir USG, Inc. v. United States48
encourages the government and commercial vendors to collaborate and
hold each other accountable when conducting business. The decision
emphasized the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act’s (FASA) mandate
that agencies prioritize commercial solutions over developmental
efforts.49 The Federal Circuit’s decision will impose an obligation on
agencies to carefully conduct market research and document the
reasons or explanations for selecting an acquisition strategy. It may also
provide commercial companies an incentive to carefully review and
provide suggestions to the specifications of a solicitation.50
1.

Background
The Army solicited bids for an upgraded Distributed Common
Ground System (DCGS-A), an intelligence software that allows the
Army and other military branches to easily share and access essential
intelligence information.51 The Army sought potential bidders to
produce a revamped system, DCGS-A2, to replace the outdated data

47. See, e.g., Richard B. Oliver & Kevin Massoudi, Congress Commissions Study of Bid Protests
Filed at Both the GAO and COFC, PILLSBURY (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.pillsburylaw.com
/en/news-and-insights/bid-protests-gao-cofc.html (describing a 2017 congressionally
mandated study of certain bid protests in order to “advance the efficiency of the acquisition
system”); Bruce Tsai, Targeting Frivolous Bid Protests by Revisiting the Competition in Contracting
Act’s Automatic Stay Provision, 13 J. OF CONT. MGMT. 215, 215 (2015) (“[F]rivolous protests are
a problem . . . . [P]rotests disrupt the Government-contractor relationship.”).
48. 904 F.3d 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
49. Id. at 983–84.
50. For additional analysis, see Steven L. Schooner, Commercial Products and Services:
Raising the Market Research Bar or Much Ado About Nothing?, 32 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 52
(2018) (stating that “[c]ontractors that believe they can provide a commercial product
that meets the Government’s needs should explicitly inform the Government of their
capabilities, early in the process, and frequently remind the Government what they bring
to the table”); Nathaniel Castellano et al., Palantir: Federal Circuit Confirms Agencies’
Obligations to Prioritize Commercial Solutions, ARNOLD & PORTER (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/09/palantir-federalcircuit-confirms-agencies (identifying the increased opportunity for, and importance of,
company objections to procurements).
51. Palantir USG, Inc. v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 218, 222–23 (2016).
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architecture of the current system.52
More specifically, the
government wanted the system to “introduce a new and modernized
data management architecture using a modular system approach to
perform Army intelligence analysis capabilities.”53
Palantir USG Inc. (“Palantir”), a contractor that already operated a
commercial data management system called “Gotham” for the
Department of Defense, encouraged the Army to use its commercial
platform, or a modified version, for DCGS-A2.54 The Gotham
contract was on a firm-fixed price, commercial-item basis.55 However,
the Army ignored Palantir’s proposals and continued its solicitation
for DCGS-A2 on a cost-plus basis.56
Palantir challenged the solicitation at GAO, arguing that the
government’s developmental approach violated § 2377 of FASA.57 Section
2377 requires federal agencies to procure commercially available
technology to the “maximum extent practicable” and to conduct market
research for existing commercial items or commercial items that could be
reasonably modified before soliciting proposals.58 GAO denied Palantir’s
protest, favoring the Army’s developmental approach.59 GAO reasoned
that no existing commercial contract met the DCGS-A2 specifications, and
that the Army’s non-commercial developmental approach was reasonably
related to its needs for the DCGS-A2 system.60
Undeterred, Palantir filed a bid protest with the Court of Federal
Claims.61 Judge Marian Blank Horn found that the Army did not
meet its obligations under § 2377 and permanently enjoined the
Army from issuing an award for the solicitation.62 The court found
that the Army’s market research was insufficient. First, the Army did
not explain or indicate which commercial items were considered or
potentially available.63 In addition, the Market Research Report
failed to acknowledge any commercial items that could have been
52. Id. at 222.
53. Id. at 223.
54. Id. at 223–24.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 226–32 (outlining Palantir’s multiple responses to the Army’s
Requests for Information).
57. Id. at 234.
58. 10 U.S.C § 2377(b), (c) (2012).
59. Palantir USG, Inc., B-412746, 2016 WL 3035029, at *4–5 (Comp. Gen. May 18, 2016).
60. Id.
61. Palantir, 129 Fed. Cl. at 221–22.
62. Id. at 282, 295.
63. Id. at 276.
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modified to potentially meet the Army’s needs.64 Even after market
research was completed, the Army did not consider whether
Palantir’s data management platform met their requirements.65
Based on the Army’s lack of discussion regarding commercial items,
the court found that the Army’s focus on a developmental approach
early in the process led to the complete exclusion of possible
commercially available alternatives.66 Judge Horn also emphasized that
the Army continued with their developmental approach despite
Palantir’s efforts to inform them that its Gotham platform could be
modified to satisfy their needs.67
2.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
The government appealed to the Federal Circuit, raising two issues:
(1) [W]hether the trial court went beyond the statutory and
regulatory language of FASA and its implementing regulations and
imposed heightened obligations; and (2) whether the trial court
wrongly discarded the presumption of regularity and substituted its
judgment in determining that the Army acted arbitrarily and
capriciously and in violation of § 2377.68

The Federal Circuit, in a decision authored by Judge Stoll and
joined by Judge Newman and Senior Judge Mayer, unanimously
upheld the lower court’s decision, finding that the Court of Federal
Claims remained within the scope of the statutory language in § 2377
and that the presumption of regularity was appropriately discarded.69
With respect to the first issue, the government argued that the
Court of Federal Claims improperly heightened the Army’s
responsibilities for its solicitation under § 2377 because it required
the Army to “fully investigate” whether any commercial items could
adequately satisfy the government’s request.70 The Federal Circuit
rejected this argument. It found that the Court of Federal Claims
required the government only to “determine” whether there were
commercial items that met the Army’s requirements or could be
modified to meet the Army’s requirements.71 Therefore, the lower

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 276–81.
Palantir USG, Inc., v. United States, 904 F.3d 980, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 990, 995.
Id. at 990.
Id.
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court correctly applied the standard set forth under § 2377(c)(2).72
The Federal Circuit noted that while the Court of Federal Claims may
have used language other than “determine” throughout its opinion,
read in context, it still had the same meaning as the word
“determine” under FASA.73 In addition, the Federal Circuit’s de novo
review of the record led it to the same conclusion: the Army failed to
“determine” under § 2377(c)(2) whether there were commercial
products available during the solicitation process that could “meet
the agency’s requirements; could be modified to meet the agency’s
requirements; or could meet the agency’s requirements if those
requirements were modified to a reasonable extent.”74
The Federal Circuit further noted that the Army was put on notice
about readily available commercial alternatives when Palantir reached
out to them.75 Despite that notice, the Army was adamant in taking a
developmental approach for its solicitation, seeking a bidder that would
build DCGS-A2 from the ground up.76 Palantir argued that this was a
complete disregard for § 2377’s requirement to procure commercial
items to the “maximum extent practicable.”77 The Federal Circuit
agreed, finding that the Army’s method was arbitrary and capricious.78
As for the second issue, the government argued that the Army was
entitled to a presumption of regularity that had not been rebutted
because it had conducted sufficient market research.79
A
presumption of regularity does not require an agency to provide a
reason or explanation for its determination.80 However, under the APA,
even if an explanation is not required, a reviewing court has the power
to require one if the presumption is “rebutted by record evidence
suggesting that the agency decision is arbitrary and capricious.”81
After thoroughly reviewing the record evidence, the Federal Circuit
rejected the Army’s argument and found that the Army’s solicitation was
arbitrary and capricious.82 It found that the Army’s market research
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 994.
77. Id. at 983.
78. Id. at 990.
79. Id. at 995.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States,
238 F.3d 1324, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
82. Id.
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failed to consider any commercially available alternatives that “(A) meet
the agency’s requirements; (B) could be modified to meet the agency’s
requirements; or (C) could meet the agency’s requirements if those
requirements were modified to a reasonable extent.”83
The Palantir decision is the first time that the Court of Federal
Claims and the Federal Circuit provided an in-depth analysis of a
federal agency’s obligations under FASA to consider commercial
solutions and opportunities.
Following the Federal Circuit’s
affirmation, agencies will likely become more accommodating to
contractors that provide commercial goods and services. When it
comes to technology and innovation, the government has lagged
behind the private sector and commercial markets. By imposing
responsibilities upon federal agencies under FASA’s mandate, this
decision will likely increase the adoption of commercial practices in
the public sector and close the gap.
Palantir is also likely to require federal agencies to take more
caution in documenting their market research and their reasons for
their solicitation strategy, especially if they choose to use a
developmental approach. The decision opens a door for commercial
companies to more frequently challenge an agency’s decision to solicit
goods or services on a non-commercial basis, especially if those
companies are able to present evidence showing that the agency had
notice of alternative commercial solutions but chose to act otherwise.
If an agency receives such notice, it should be careful to research and
document the reasons why it chose to use a non-commercial approach.
C. Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States
Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States84 is a pre-award bid protest
decision that initially promised to resolve a divide among Court of
Federal Claims judges as to whether “prudential standing”
requirements apply to bid protests. Instead of reaching the issue of
prudential standing, the Federal Circuit made a relatively surprising
decision that the Court of Federal Claims lacked subject matter
jurisdiction on the basis that Cleveland Assets was challenging the
solicitation’s compliance with an “appropriation statute” instead of a
“procurement statute.”85 While Cleveland Assets will not impact most
83. Id. at 994.
84. 883 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
85. See id. at 1381 (affirming the dismissal of Count II, but for lack of jurisdiction
rather than lack of standing).
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bid protests, it may serve as a previously unforeseen limit to the Court of
Federal Claims’s bid protest jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b).86
1.

Background
Cleveland Assets arose from a Government Services Administration
(GSA) Request for Lease Proposals (RLP) seeking a secure space for
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Cleveland Field Office.
The FBI Cleveland Field Office was housed in a building leased from
Cleveland Assets since February 2002. The lease was initially set to
expire in January 2012 but was extended multiple times.87
Under 40 U.S.C. § 3307, GSA must seek approval of two
congressional committees before obligating funds on a lease where
the annual rent will exceed $2.85 million.88 This statute requires GSA
to submit a prospectus describing, among other things, the property
it intends to lease and an estimate of the price it will ultimately pay.89
In 2009, GSA began preparing for a new lease for the FBI
Cleveland Field Office.90 It provided the congressional committees
with a final prospectus in December 2010 that set forth an estimated
rental rate of $26.00 per square foot.91 By September 2011, the
relevant committees adopted resolutions approving the prospectus at
that rate.92 Over five years later, GSA issued an RLP that, pursuant to
§ 3307, stated GSA would award a lease only if the offered rental rate
did not exceed the “[c]ongressionally-imposed rent limitation” of
$26.00 per square foot.93 The Federal Circuit’s decision explained
that pursuant to the lease extensions, “GSA has paid, and continues
to pay, Cleveland Assets a penalty rate of $44.72 per rentable square
foot (“PSF”) since the expiration of the original 10-year period.”94

86. See generally Stuart W. Turner & Nathaniel E. Castellano, Federal Circuit Implies
Narrowing of Claims Court Jurisdiction, ARNOLD & PORTER (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/03/fed-circ-imp
lies-narrowing-of-claims-court (describing the implications of the Cleveland Assets
decision on Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction).
87. Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 264, 267–68 (2017).
88. Id. at 268 (citing 40 U.S.C. § 3307(a)(2) (2012)).
89. Id. (citing § 3307(b)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 270.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 271.
94. Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 883 F.3d 1378, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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Cleveland Assets filed a pre-award bid protest challenging the RLP
under three relevant allegations.95 Count II asserted that GSA exceeded
its authority to solicit offers under § 3307, and Counts III and IV alleged
that the $26.00 PSF limitation was unreasonably low, imposed an undue
restriction on competition and shifted all risk to the contractor.96
Judge Kaplan of the Court of Federal Claims granted judgment on
the administrative record in favor of the government on Counts III
and IV because it found that GSA did not abuse its discretion when it
selected the $26.00 PSF rental cap.97 The court dismissed Count II
because, although it considered that Cleveland Assets may have had
standing as an “interested party” under the Tucker Act, it found that
Cleveland Assets lacked the “prudential standing” necessary to bring a
claim.98 Prudential standing is a doctrine that originated in the
administrative law context. Even if a plaintiff challenging the
government’s violation of a statute has some interest in the
government’s action, to have “prudential” standing, those interests
must be within the “zone of interests protected or regulated by the
statutory provision” at issue—i.e. the statute must have, in some
sense, been enacted to protect or control entities in the plaintiff’s
position.99 However, the judges of the Court of Federal Claims are
divided on whether the requirements of prudential standing apply in
protest cases brought under the Tucker Act.100
Judge Kaplan found that Congress did not exempt the Tucker Act
from the prudential standing requirement.101 Judge Kaplan further
ruled that Cleveland Assets’ interest in keeping the current FBI lease
(or winning a new one) is not within the “zone of interests” protected
by the appropriations rules set out in § 3307.102 Judge Kaplan explained
that while § 3307(a) requires an agency to secure approval from two
95. Cleveland Assets, 132 Fed. Cl. at 267.
96. Id. at 267, 274.
97. See id. at 279–82 (finding that GSA reasonably determined the rental rate for the RLP).
98. Id. at 275–77.
99. Id. at 275 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997)).
100. Compare MORI Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 503, 542 (2011)
(stating that the zone of interests standard does “not apply to bid protests brought as
a breach of the duty to fairly and honestly consider bids”), and Santa Barbara
Applied Research, Inc. v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 536, 544 (2011) (determining
prudential standing does not apply under § 1491(b)), with Hallmark-Phoenix 3, LLC
v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 65, 70 (2011) (holding prudential standing does apply to
cases brought under 1491(b)).
101. Cleveland Assets, 132 Fed. Cl. at 277.
102. Id. at 275.
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congressional committees in order to enter into a lease over a specified
dollar amount, the purpose of the statute was not to protect a private
contractor such as Cleveland Assets.103 The goal of § 3307(a) was to provide
congressional oversight over certain agency actions, and certainly not to
provide private parties or contractors an avenue for judicial review.104
2.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
Cleveland Assets appealed the Court of Federal Claims’s
decision.105 With respect to Cleveland Assets’ claim that the RLP
violated § 3307, the parties’ briefing focused entirely on whether the
Court of Federal Claims correctly applied the “prudential standing”
requirement. Cleveland Assets argued that the standing requirement
for bid protests is only that the protester be an “interested party” and
does not include any “zone of interest” requirement.106
The
government, in turn, argued that the Court of Federal Claims properly
imposed a zone of interest test.107
While the oral argument, held before Judges Moore, Hughes, and
Stoll, initially focused on the issue of prudential standing, the panel
indicated during the government’s response an interest in whether
§ 3307 is a “procurement statute” that could be enforced in the bid
protest process at all.108
This line of reasoning carried through to the unanimous opinion,
authored by Judge Moore, which declined to reach the prudential
standing issue at all and instead held that § 1491(b) confers
jurisdiction only over challenges in connection with a
procurement.109 It does not cover allegations of a violation of § 3307

103. Id. at 277.
104. Id.
105. Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 883 F.3d 1378, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
106. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 3–4, Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 883
F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2113) (contending that a party has standing in a bid
protest if it is an actual or prospective bidder and has a direct economic interest in the bid).
107. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 15, Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States,
883 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2113) (agreeing with the trial court that
Cleveland Assets challenges lacked standing to challenge because it was in the “zone
of interests” authorizing the appropriations for leases under § 3307).
108. See Oral Argument at 32:00, Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 883 F.3d
1378 (No. 17-2113), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings?title=cl
eveland+assets&field_case_number_value=&field_date_value2%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdat%5D=
(questioning whether an appropriation statute has any connection to procurements).
109. See Cleveland Assets, 883 F.3d at 1381.
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because it is “an appropriation, not a procurement, statute.”110 The
Federal Circuit was concerned about unnecessarily expanding the
scope of bid protest jurisdiction.111 The decision also proves the
court’s strong preference for plain language interpretation, noting
that “the word ‘procurement’ is nowhere to be found in § 3307” 112:
While the Claims Court dismissed Count II on prudential standing
grounds, we need not reach that issue because the plain language
of 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) expressly precludes Claims Court
jurisdiction over Count II of the complaint. Section 1491(b)(1)
only confers jurisdiction over challenges to statutes or regulations
“in connection with a procurement or proposed procurement.” 28
U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) . . . . We have previously interpreted § 1491(b)
to extend only to actions in which “the government at least
initiated a procurement, or initiated ‘the process for determining a
need’ for acquisition.” The phrase “procurement” therefore limits
the types of government action that the Claims Court has
jurisdiction to review under § 1491(b). If plaintiffs could allege
any statutory or regulatory violation tangentially related to a
government procurement, § 1491(b)(1) jurisdiction risks
expanding far beyond the procurement context.
The only statute alleged to be violated by Cleveland Assets in Count
II is 40 U.S.C. § 3307, an appropriation, not a procurement,
statute. The plain text of § 3307 demonstrates that the statute is
directed to “appropriations [being] made only” pursuant to approval
by the specified congressional committees.
While the word
“procurement” is nowhere to be found in the statute, “appropriation”
is used eight times.
The statutory structure confirms our plain language reading of the
statute. The structure of 40 U.S.C. § 3307 directs GSA how to apply
for an appropriation, but it says nothing of how GSA must run its
procurement once the appropriation is made . . . . If we were to
read § 3307 as a procurement statute, every appropriations bill and
rider would become a potential source of challenge for any
interested party under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1).113

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Court of Federal Claims
holding that Cleveland Assets had not shown GSA’s decision to

110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1381–82.
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impose a $26.00 PSF rent cap to be arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise
not in accordance with law.114
3.

On petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc
Cleveland Assets filed a petition for panel rehearing and rehearing
en banc—both petitions were denied.115 The petitions argued that
the panel erred in finding that Cleveland Assets’ claim fell beyond
the Court of Federal Claims’s jurisdiction and that prudential
standing does not apply to bid protests under § 1491(b).116 Judge
Wallach, joined by Judge Newman, dissented from the denial of en
banc rehearing.117 Judge Wallach voiced several concerns with the
panel’s conclusion that Cleveland Assets’ claim fell beyond the scope
of § 1491(b) jurisdiction, emphasizing prior Federal Circuit
precedent describing the broad scope of § 1491(b).118
On balance, Cleveland Assets is unlikely to impact most bid protests
brought under § 1491(b), which often allege violations of the
Competition in Contracting Act119 and the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR).120 However, in more unique protests that test
jurisdictional limits, such as those challenging the award of an Other
Transaction Agreement,121 the holding of Cleveland Assets that
§ 1491(b) extends only to alleged violations of “procurement”
statutes may prove to be an important limitation on the Court of
Federal Claims’s bid protest jurisdiction. Moreover, it appears that
the Court of Federal Claims remains divided as to whether prudential
standing applies as an additional limit to bid protest standing.
114. See id. at 1382 (noting that the standard of review is highly deferential to the
agency and Cleveland Assets did not meet its burden of proof).
115. Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 897 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
116. Plaintiff-Appellant’s Combined Petition for Rehearing at 6, Cleveland Assets,
LLC v. United States, 883 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2113).
117. Cleveland Assets, 897 F.3d at 1333 (Wallach, J., dissenting).
118. See id. (arguing that the majority opinion narrows the court’s jurisdiction too
much and could set a negative precedent for future cases).
119. Pub. L. No. 98-396, §§ 2701–2753, 98 Stat. 494, 1175 (1984) (codified as
amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3312 (2012)).
120. See FAR ch. 1 (2018). The FAR provides the principal set of rules for
government procurement by federal executive agencies in the United States.
121. See generally Stuart W. Turner & Nathaniel Castellano, Other Transactions Authority
(OTA): Protests and Disputes, ARNOLD & PORTER (June 28, 2018), https://www.arnold
porter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/06/other-transactions-authority-ota-protests
(explaining that Other Transaction Authority “is a rubric describing a set of statutes that
explicitly grant certain agencies the authority to enter into agreements other than
procurement contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements”).
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D. PDS Consultants, Inc. v. United States
In PDS Consultants, Inc. v. United States,122 the Federal Circuit
resolved an existing conflict between two statutory schemes designed
to give contracting preferences to “two historically disadvantaged
groups: veterans and disabled persons.”123 This case required the
Federal Circuit to once again address the scope of the Department of
Veterans Affairs’ (VA) obligations to consider setting aside
procurements for competition among veteran-owned small businesses
through a process known as the “Rule of Two”124 under the Veterans
Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006
(VBA).125 Just two years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court considered this
statute in Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States126 and held that
the VBA “unambiguously requires the [VA] to use the Rule of Two
before contracting under the competitive procedures.”127
At the same time, the Javits-Wagner O’Day Act128 (JWOD) requires
all federal government agencies to procure designated products and
services from qualified nonprofit agencies operated by, and employing,
blind or significantly disabled individuals.129 The Federal Circuit
addressed the conflict between the VBA (as interpreted by Kingdomware)
and the JWOD and concluded that the VA must follow the VBA’s Rule
of Two requirement in every procurement;130 the VA cannot circumvent
the VBA’s requirement by turning to JWOD-mandated sources.
1.

Background
The JWOD’s mandatory sourcing requirements are fulfilled
through a procurement list of eligible products and services (the
“List”) that is maintained by the Committee for Purchase from
People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled (the “AbilityOne
122. 907 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
123. Id. at 1348.
124. See id. at 1350 (explaining that the Rule of Two is a congressional “preference
for awarding contracts restricted to veteran-owned small business[es]” (citing 38
U.S.C. § 8127(d))).
125. Pub. L. No. 109-461, 120 Stat. 3403 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered
sections in 38 U.S.C.).
126. 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016).
127. Id. at 1976.
128. Pub. L. No. 92-28, 85 Stat. 77 (1971) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C.
§§ 8501–06 (2012)).
129. See 41 U.S.C. § 8504 (codifying the requirement that all procurements under
§ 8503 come from a qualified nonprofit agency).
130. PDS Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 907 F.3d 1345, 1357–61 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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Commission”).131 In the early 2000s, before passage of the VBA, the
AbilityOne Commission added to the List eyewear and eyewear
prescription services provided by the VA through two Veterans
Integrated Service Networks (VISNs), and the VA awarded contracts
for these services to Winston-Salem Industries for the Blind
(Industries for the Blind).132 Then in February 2016, after the VBA’s
enactment but before the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingdomware,
the AbilityOne Commission published a notice proposing to add to
the List eyewear services under another one of the VA’s VISNs.133
The Kingdomware decision was released shortly thereafter, which
prompted PDS Consultants (PDS)—a service-disabled veteran-owned
small business that provides eyewear services—to write to the
AbilityOne Commission and assert that the Commission’s proposal to
add additional VISNs to the List would violate the VA’s obligation under
the VBA to consider setting aside all procurements to veteran-owned
small businesses.134 The AbilityOne Commission considered PDS’s
comments but ultimately voted to add the additional VISN to the List.135
PDS filed a bid protest in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking an
injunction requiring the VA to perform the Rule of Two analysis
mandated by the VBA when procuring eyewear services under any of
the agency’s VISNs.136 Under the VBA’s Rule of Two requirement,
the VA must set aside a contract for competition among veteranowned small businesses if the contracting officer reasonably expects
that two or more veteran-owned small businesses will compete for the
contract.137 PDS pointed to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kingdomware to argue that the VBA’s Rule of Two requirement took
priority over the JWOD.138
The Court of Federal Claims ruled in favor of PDS and held that
the VBA’s Rule of Two took priority over the JWOD for all VA
procurements.139 It explained that the decision in Kingdomware
obligates the VA to use the Rule of Two, and that the VBA should take

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 1348–49.
Id. at 1352–53.
Id. at 1353.
Id.
Id. at 1353–54.
See generally PDS Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 117 (2017).
Id. at 119.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 128.
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priority over the JWOD because it was “more specific.”140 The court
also noted that the VBA priority applies only to VA procurements,
while the JWOD applies to all federal agency procurements.141
2.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
The United States and Industries for the Blind appealed to the
Federal Circuit.142 In an opinion authored by Judge O’Malley and
joined by Chief Judge Prost and Judge Stoll, the Federal Circuit upheld
the Court of Federal Claims’s decision and held that the VA must use
the Rule of Two even when goods and services are on the List.143
The Federal Circuit first considered various arguments by the
Industries for the Blind that the Court of Federal Claims lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to hear PDS’s claims. Industries for the Blind argued
that: (1) PDS’s protest was nothing more than a challenge to the validity
of the AbilityOne Program as a whole and VA regulations that could
only be heard in district court under the APA; and (2) the “purchases
from the List ‘are not ‘procurements’ for purposes of Tucker Act
jurisdiction.”144 The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments and held
that PDS’s “claims fall squarely within Tucker Act jurisdiction.”145 The
court found that PDS alleged a statutory violation relating to the VA’s
procurements—“namely, that the VA acted in violation of the VBA by
awarding contracts without first conducting the Rule of Two analysis.”146
In an effort to distinguish this case from its earlier decision in Cleveland
Assets, the court noted that none of the parties disputed that “the VBA is
a statute that relates to all VA procurements” and is thus “[f]ar from
being ‘tangentially related to a government procurement.’”147 Hence,
the Federal Circuit held that the Court of Federal Claims properly found
that it had jurisdiction over PDS’s claims.
The Federal Circuit then reviewed the plain language of both the
VBA and the JWOD and explained that it needed to determine: (1)
140. Id. at 127–28.
141. Id. at 119–20.
142. See generally PDS Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 907 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
143. Id. at 1360.
144. Id. at 1355. The Federal Circuit explained in a footnote that the government was
not appealing the Court of Claims’s exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction and had “taken
the opposing view in related litigation, contending that such actions are essentially bid
protests that fall under the [Court of Federal Claims’s] jurisdiction.” Id. at 1355 n.6.
145. Id. at 1356.
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 883 F.3d 1378, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2018)).
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whether the statutes conflict with each other and, if so, to what extent;
and (2) whether an alternative means for reconciling the provisions
can be found in standard principles of statutory interpretation.148
With respect to the first issue, the VA argued that the statutes do not
conflict because the VBA applied only to “non-mandatory, competitive
awards.”149 The Federal Circuit rejected the argument and explained that:
[B]y its express language, the [VBA] applies to all contracts—not
only competitive contracts. The statute requires that, when the Rule
of Two is triggered—i.e., when “the contracting officer has a
reasonable expectation that two or more small business concerns
owned and controlled by veterans will submit offers and that the
award can be made at a fair and reasonable price that offers best
value to the United States”—the VA must apply competitive
mechanisms to determine to whom the contract should be awarded.150

As for the second issue, the court found that an alternative means
could be found in standard principles of statutory interpretation
because specific statutes take priority over general ones.151 The
Federal Circuit pointed to Congress’s intent when it enacted the VBA
to explain that the VBA was more specific than the JWOD:
While the JWOD applies to all agencies of the federal government, the
VBA applies only to VA procurements and only when the Rule of Two is
satisfied. The express, specific directives in § 8127(d), thus, override the
more general contracting requirements of the JWOD . . . . The VBA,
moreover, was expressly enacted to “increase contracting opportunities
for small business concerns owned and controlled by veterans and . . . by
veterans with service-connected disabilities.” Consistent with the VA’s duty
to support and champion the veteran community, the VBA created the
Veterans First Contracting Program (“Veterans First”), which requires the
VA to give “contracting priority” to qualified service-disabled veteranowned small businesses and veteran-owned small businesses. And it
specifies that the Secretary, “[i]n procuring goods and services pursuant
to a contracting preference under this title or any other provision of law . . .
shall give priority to a small business concern owned and controlled by
veterans, if such business concern also meets the requirements of that
contracting preference.”152

148. Id. at 1357, 1358.
149. Id. at 1358.
150. Id. (citation omitted).
151. See id. (explaining that under basic tenets of statutory construction, specific
statutes take precedence over general ones).
152. Id. at 1358–59 (citations omitted).

2019]

2018 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS LAW DECISIONS

1397

The Federal Circuit also considered the fact that the VBA was enacted
years after the JWOD. Since Congress enacted the VBA over thirty years
after the JWOD, the Federal Circuit inferred that the VBA controls VA
procurements while the JWOD dictates broader non-VA procurements.153
Finally, the Federal Circuit noted that Congress had passed a
similar statute in 2003—the Veteran Benefits Act—that gave the VA
the discretion to consider setting aside procurements for servicedisabled veteran-owned small businesses, but explicitly exempted the
The court thus
JWOD’s mandatory sourcing requirement.154
“assume[d] that Congress was aware that it wrote an exception into
the agency-wide Veterans Benefits Act in 2003 when it left that very
same exception out of the VBA only three years later.”155
The decision in PDS Consultants, Inc. once again provides a strict
reading of the VBA’s provisions and reiterates that the VA is required
to use the Rule of Two for all of its procurements. This decision is a
logical extension of Kingdomware and the agency-specific
requirements that the VBA imposes on the VA. Nevertheless, this
decision will undeniably be seen as a blow to the AbilityOne program,
as well as the many blind and disabled individuals who are dependent
on the AbilityOne program to earn a living.
E. AgustaWestland North America, Inc. v. United States
AgustaWestland North America, Inc. v. United States156 is another decision
that provides further guidance on the scope of the court’s bid protest
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b). AgustaWestland filed a pre-award
protest challenging an Army sole source Justification & Approval (J&A).157
After the Court of Federal Claims sustained the protest, the Federal Circuit
reversed on three grounds in a decision that shows the Federal Circuit’s
tendency to narrow the scope of § 1491(b) jurisdiction for unique claims.158
1.

Background
In 2006, following full and open competition in which AgustaWestland
submitted an unsuccessful proposal, the Army awarded Airbus a contract
to provide 322 Light Utility Helicopters over the course of ten years.159
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 1359 (citing United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 532 (1998)).
Id. at 1349–50.
Id. at 1359.
880 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
See id. at 1329–30.
See id. at 1335.
Id. at 1328.

1398

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1373

The contract required that Airbus provide eight UH-72A Lakota
helicopters in the first year and provided the Army with the option to
purchase up to 483 additional Lakotas.160
In accordance with an initiative to reduce the defense budget, in
2013 the Army issued the Aviation Restructure Initiative “designed to
deliver the best Army Aviation force possible within resource
constraints.”161 This included “redistributing of assets” and “reducing
aircraft types and standardizing Aviation brigade designs.”162
The Army then issued a policy decision designating the Lakota as
the “Institutional Training Helicopter” at Fort Rucker through an
Army Execution Order on April 3, 2014.163 The Army determined
that it needed to increase the number of Lakotas from 317 to 427.164
To obtain these additional aircraft, the Army exercised all remaining
options under the Airbus contract but was sixteen Lakotas short of its
objective.165 Because Airbus had exclusive ownership over the data
rights required to produce and maintain the Lakotas, the Army was
faced with the prospect of either purchasing sixteen additional Lakotas
on a sole source basis from Airbus or procuring sixteen alternate
aircraft.166 The Army chose to issue a sole source award to Airbus for the
remaining sixteen Lakotas, supported by a J&A explaining the costs and
delay associated with procuring and sustaining an alternate aircraft.167
AgustaWestland filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, arguing that
the Execution Order designating the Lakota as the institutional training
helicopter was an improper procurement decision.168 AgustaWestland
also challenged the Army’s sole source award for the sixteen remaining
Lakotas.169
Court of Federal Claims Judge Braden sustained AgustaWestland’s
protest.170 Judge Braden first held that the Army’s “Execution Order” was a
“procurement” decision that contravened the Competition in Contracting

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id. at 1329.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
AgustaWestland N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 793, 801 (2016).
Id.
Id. at 798.
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Act and the FAR.171 Judge Braden then granted AgustaWestland’s motion
to supplement the administrative record with respect to the sole source
award and held that the decision to purchase the additional sixteen aircraft
was arbitrary and capricious.172 The Army appealed.
2.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
In an unanimous decision authored by Judge Hughes and joined
by Chief Judge Prost and Judge Chen, the Federal Circuit reversed all
three of the Court of Federal Claims’s holdings.173 First, the Federal
Circuit held that the Execution Order was a policy decision, not a
protestable decision made “in connection with a procurement” that fell
within the court’s jurisdiction.174 While many Federal Circuit decisions
expound on the broad nature of the court’s protest jurisdiction under
§ 1491(b), the AgustaWestland opinion adds to the body of cases tending
to narrow the scope of that jurisdiction for unique claims:
[In Distributed Solutions w]e clarified that to “establish jurisdiction
pursuant to this definition, [a contractor] must demonstrate that
the government at least initiated a procurement, or initiated ‘the
process for determining a need’ for acquisition.”
One objective of the restructuring initiative, formalized in the
Execution Order, was to “[r]eplace the aging Aviation institutional
training fleet at Fort Rucker.” To accomplish this objective, the
initiative instructed that “the Institutional Training Helicopter fleet
is converted to UH-72s and the legacy TH-67 training helicopter is
divested.” The initiative did not, however, direct or even discuss
the procurement of UH-72A Lakota helicopters. In fact, the
initiative only contemplated using existing Army assets.
The Execution Order, therefore, was not a procurement decision
subject to Tucker Act jurisdiction because it did not begin “the
process for determining a need for property or services.” The

171. See id. at 810–11 (noting that because the Army’s Execution Order determined a
need for property, it was a “quintessential procurement decision” that failed to satisfy the
requisite “justification review for other than a full and open competition”).
172. See id. at 817 (reasoning that “since the entire purpose of a J&A [justification
and approval] is to explain and justify why competition is not required for a
procurement, the Contracting Officer’s decision that ‘the justification [is] adequate
to support other than full competition,’ prior to the review and approval of Legal
Counsel and the SCA prima facie was arbitrary and capricious”).
173. AgustaWestland N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 880 F.3d 1326 (2018).
174. Id. at 1330–31.
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Execution Order simply formalized the Army’s decision designating
the UH-72A Lakota as the Army’s training helicopter.175

Second, in a ruling reminiscent to its earlier decision in Axiom
Resource Management, Inc. v. United States,176 the Federal Circuit held
that the lower court erred in allowing AgustaWestland to supplement
the administrative record. The Federal Circuit explained that the
Court of Federal Claims had an obligation to show why the omitted
evidence from the record did not allow the court to conduct
“effective judicial review” of the ultimate issue in the case.177 Instead,
the Court of Federal Claims merely provided conclusory statements
“that it could not conduct effective judicial review without the
supplemented material.”178 The Federal Circuit thus held that the
administrative record was sufficient to review the Army’s procurement
award and concluded that “the trial court abused its discretion by
supplementing the record[] and relying on the supplemental evidence
to reach its decision.”179
According to the Federal Circuit, the Court of Federal Claims did
not explain why the current record was insufficient before permitting
supplementation of the record. Instead, the lower court merely
concluded that it would not be able to conduct “effective judicial
review” without providing any evidence to support that position.180
Finally, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s
determination that the J&A in support of the Army’s sole source
award was inadequate.181 Instead, the Federal Circuit found that the
agency provided “a coherent and reasonable explanation of its
exercise of discretion, and therefore the justifications for the solesource award are not arbitrary and capricious.”182 The J&A relied on
two justifications: (1) significant duplicated costs in procuring and
sustaining a different aircraft that would not be recovered through

175. Id. (citations omitted).
176. 564 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In Axiom Resource Management, the Federal
Circuit concluded “that the trial court abused its discretion . . . by adding Axiom’s
documents to the record without evaluating whether the record before the agency
was sufficient to permit meaningful judicial review.” Id. at 1380.
177. AgustaWestland, 880 F.3d at 1331–32.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1331.
181. Id. at 1333.
182. Id.
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competition, and (2) unacceptable delays in the Army’s missions,
exposing the nation to security and safety risks.183
The first justification was supported by an Independent
Government Estimate of the cost of duplicating another competitive
action.184 Notably, the Court of Federal Claims criticized the Army
for failing to consider the premium Airbus could charge for its
intellectual property, or whether Airbus could extract a supracompetitive premium for the Lakotas.185 The Federal Circuit found
this concern to be irrelevant. The Federal Circuit noted that Airbus
already refused a prior government request for an estimation of
intellectual property costs and informed the government the data was
not for sale. Since Airbus was unwilling to sell the data, the potential
increased costs of intellectual property was irrelevant.186
Overall, the Federal Circuit’s decision in AgustaWestland
demonstrates the discretion afforded to agencies in making certain
requirements determinations, as well as the court’s view of the limits
of bid protest jurisdiction under § 1491(b).
F. CliniComp International, Inc. v. United States
In CliniComp International v. United States,187 an incumbent
contractor—CliniComp—protested a sole-source award to a different
contractor to provide an electronic health records (EHR) system to
the VA.188 The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the protest due to a
lack of standing, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the
lower court did not err in holding that CliniComp lacked the requisite
experience to perform the large-scale sole-source contract.189 The
Federal Circuit’s decision could be read to require pre-award protestors
who challenge solicitation terms to prove standing by showing they
would have qualified to compete for the contract.190

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1333–34.
186. Id. (citations omitted).
187. 904 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
188. Id. at 1356–57.
189. Id. at 1357, 1359.
190. See generally Stuart W. Turner & Nathaniel E. Castellano, Federal Circuit Ruling
Highlights Bid Protester Standing Issues, ARNOLD & PORTER (Sept. 25, 2018),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/09/fed-circ-rul
ing-highlights-bid-protester (providing background on the Federal Circuit’s protester
standing jurisprudence and explaining the potential impacts of the CliniComp decision).
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1.

Background
In 2011, the VA and the Department of Defense (DOD)
determined that they would both upgrade their EHR systems. Their
intention was to have one “common system” that supports
interoperability between the agencies.191 The DOD upgraded its EHR
system first.192 In 2015, it procured an EHR system that consisted
primarily of commercial software developed by Cerner Corporation
(Cerner).193 Then, in 2017, the VA Secretary issued a Determination
& Findings (D&F) to contract with Cerner on a sole-source award
basis, relying on the public-interest exception under the Competition
in Contracting Act to avoid full and open competition.194
Subsequently, CliniComp protested the proposed Cerner contract,
contending that it should have gone through a competitive process.195
To support this contention, CliniComp argued that the VA “failed to
engage in advance planning” and that “the Secretary’s award decision
[was] a brand-name justification.”196
Judge Griggsby of the Court of Federal Claims dismissed the
protest, finding that CliniComp lacked standing because it failed to
show that it had a “direct economic interest.”197 To satisfy the “direct
economic interest” requirement, CliniComp had to show that it had a
“substantial chance of receiving the contract” if the VA used a
competitive process.198 Unfortunately for CliniComp, the Court of
Federal Claims concluded that CliniComp did not have sufficient
experience in EHR services to compete for the contract described in
the VA Secretary’s D&F.199 In evaluating CliniComp’s experience, the
court compared the dollar value, scope, and nature of CliniComp’s
prior work for the VA with the proposed Cerner contract.200
The Court of Federal Claims also rejected CliniComp’s argument
that it could have provided an “alternative solution” to satisfy the VA’s
needs, explaining: “[T]he question before the Court is not whether

191. CliniComp Int’l, 904 F.3d at 1356.
192. Id.
193. See id. (noting that the DOD awarded Cerner a $4.3 billion contract for the
EHR system).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1357.
196. CliniComp Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 736, 748 (2017).
197. Id. at 749.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 749–52.
200. Id. at 750–52.
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CliniComp could offer the VA an alternative solution. But, rather,
whether CliniComp could compete for the contract that the
Secretary has decided to award to Cerner.”201
2.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
CliniComp appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the
Court of Federal Claims and dismissed the protest for lack of
standing.202 In an opinion authored by Chief Judge Prost and joined
by Judges Wallach and Toronto, the Federal Circuit found that there
was no “clear error” when the Court of Federal Claims determined
that CliniComp did not have the relevant experience to compete for
the proposed Cerner contract.203
CliniComp raised a series of arguments. First, it contended that
the Court of Federal Claims incorrectly applied the standard adopted
in Myers Investigative and Security Services, Inc. v. United States,204 which
requires the protestor to show that it “could compete for the contract if
the bid process were made competitive.”205 CliniComp asserted that
the court should have instead applied the standard from Weeks Marine,
Inc. v. United States,206 which requires the protestor to show only a “nontrivial competitive injury which can be addressed by judicial relief.”207
The Federal Circuit ultimately concluded that the Myers standard was
the proper standard.208 However, it explained that even if the Weeks
Marine standard were applied, CliniComp would still lack standing:
CliniComp failed to show that it was a qualified bidder . . . . Absent
such a showing, CliniComp could not satisfy the “non-trivial
competitive injury” standard for prejudice set forth in Weeks
Marine . . . . [A]lthough we apply the standard for prejudice as
articulated in Myers, our conclusion would be the same applying the
“non-trivial competitive injury” standard set forth in Weeks Marine.209

Second, the Federal Circuit rejected CliniComp’s argument that
there was no way for the Court of Federal Claims to determine that it
was “incapable of performing the contract” because the requirements

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 751.
CliniComp Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 904 F.3d 1353, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1359.
275 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1370 (internal quotation marks omitted).
575 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
CliniComp Int’l, 904 F.3d at 1358–59 (quoting Weeks Marine, Inc., 575 F.3d at 1361–62).
See id. at 1358, 1360.
Id. at 1359–60.
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of the proposed Cerner contract were “not known.”210 The Federal
Circuit noted that this was “not a case where a plaintiff is unable to
demonstrate its ability to compete due to a lack of information about
what is required.”211 Instead, the Federal Circuit found that CliniComp
lacked standing “because it failed to demonstrate an ability to perform
specific requirements that are set forth in the administrative record.”212
Finally, the Federal Circuit was unpersuaded by CliniComp’s
contention that it could have hired subcontractors to assist it in
completing the work. The Federal Circuit found that CliniComp’s
“vague, cursory references to using subcontractors to perform the
work it is unable to do are insufficient to cure CliniComp’s otherwise
deficient showing that it is a qualified bidder.”213
The Federal Circuit’s decision in CliniComp shows that contractors
protesting sole source awards or the terms of a solicitation must
provide sufficient evidence to show that they are qualified to compete.
G. Progressive Industries, Inc. v. United States
Progressive Industries, Inc. v. United States214 involves a disappointed
bidder’s noncompliance with procedural deadlines. The VA solicited
proposals to procure medical gases for its medical facilities.215 After
being notified that it had not been awarded the contracts, Progressive
filed a bid protest in the Court of Federal Claims arguing that it was
treated unfairly when the VA established the competitive range.216
The court sustained Progressive’s protest in part and enjoined the VA
from awarding the contracts.217
The day after judgment was entered, the VA filed a status report
explaining that it planned to award emergency bridge contracts to
the original awardees while it re-solicited the contracts.218 Three
weeks later, following some back-and-forth relating to Progressive’s
ability to seek costs and attorney fees, the Court of Federal Claims
entered an amended judgment that removed a sentence reading, “No

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 1360.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1360–61.
888 F.3d 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1249–50.
Progressive Indus., Inc. v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 457, 469–70 (2016).
Id. at 486; Progressive Indus., 888 F.3d at 1250.
Progressive Indus., 888 F.3d at 1250.
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costs.”219 A month later, Progressive filed a motion for reconsideration
of amended judgment, requesting that the VA reevaluate the bid
proposals in the competitive range instead of re-soliciting the
contract.220 The Court of Federal Claims denied Progressive’s motion
as untimely. According to Rule 59(e) of the Rules of the Court of
Federal Claims, to be timely, Progressive had to submit a motion for
reconsideration within twenty-eight days after entry of judgment.221
The Court of Federal Claims held that the time for filing a motion for
reconsideration began on the date of the court’s original judgment,
not its amended judgment.222
Progressive appealed to the Federal Circuit.223 In a decision
authored by Chief Judge Prost and joined by Judge Reyna and Senior
Judge Mayer, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision
and explained that the amended judgment merely changed the
collateral issue of costs, and thus did not restart the time for filing:
“[T]he original judgment in this case ended the litigation on the merits,
and any ongoing disputes regarding costs or attorney fees were merely
collateral issues . . . . Moreover, Progressive’s Rule 59(e) motion addressed
matters that had not been modified by the amended judgment.”224
Progressive also tried to obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6) of the
Rules of the Court of Federal Claims, which “states that ‘the court
may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding’ for ‘any other reason that justifies relief.’”225
However, the court can grant this form of relief only under
“extraordinary circumstances.”226 Progressive argued on appeal that
“extraordinary circumstances” existed because it would be excluded
from the re-solicited contract due to the VA’s intent to set aside the

219. Id. at 1251–52.
220. Id. at 1252.
221. See id. at 1252–53 & n.4 (noting that Rule 59(e) of the Rules of the Court of
Federal Claims is the same as Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
222. See id. at 1253 (explaining that the original judgment was entered on
November 2, 2016, but Progressive’s motion for reconsideration was not filed until
December 20, 2016).
223. Id. at 1252.
224. Id. at 1254 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
225. Id. at 1255 & n.11 (quoting Rule 60(b)(6) of the Rules of the Court of
Federal Claims) (commenting that language of Rule 60(b)(6) is the same as Rule
60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
226. Id. at 1255 (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.
847, 863 (1988)).
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contract for Service-Disabled Veteran Owned Small Businesses.227
The Federal Circuit found that the Court of Federal Claims did not
abuse its discretion in denying Progressive’s motion:
In denying Progressive’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the [Court of
Federal Claims] noted that Progressive could have raised its
concerns regarding the potential impact of Kingdomware before the
original judgment was entered. Although Progressive attempts to
explain its rationale for not doing so, there is no indication that
Progressive was somehow prevented from raising this issue earlier.
And, regardless, it is unclear whether Progressive would have been
able to avoid the application of Kingdomware even if Progressive had
raised the issue prior to judgment.228

The decision in Progressive Industries shows that protesters need to
be diligent about adhering to procedural deadlines, even after
obtaining a favorable judgment.
II. CONTRACT DISPUTES
A. Securiforce International America, LLC v. United States
In 1978, Congress passed the Contracts Disputes Act (CDA) with
the stated purpose of providing “a fair, balanced, and comprehensive
statutory system of legal and administrative remedies in resolving
government contract claims.”229 The CDA also “removed the contract
disputes process from the discretionary realm of agency-imposed
contract clauses and established a fixed statutory framework that
continues to this day.”230 But after the CDA’s passage, a range of
judicial decisions and interpretative issues arose that “began to
obstruct the inexpensive and expeditious resolution of disputes
called for by [the CDA].”231
In a recent example of these
interpretative issues, Securiforce International America, LLC v. United
States232 adds further complexity to the role that the Court of Federal

227. Id. at 1255–56. The VA intended to set aside the contract following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
1969 (2016). Progressive argued that it would be excluded because the two original
awardees were veteran-owned small businesses, whereas Progressive was not.
Progressive Indus., 888 F.3d at 1255–56.
228. Progressive Indus., 888 F.3d at 1256.
229. S. Rep. No. 95-1118, at 1 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5235.
230. Swan, supra note 3, at 112.
231. Burg, supra note 15, at 174.
232. 879 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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Claims and Board of Contract Appeals play in deciding arguments
raised during the litigation of CDA claims.
1.

Background
In early September 2011, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
awarded a requirements contract to Securiforce International America,
LLC (Securiforce) for the delivery of fuel to eight sites in Iraq.233 Shortly
thereafter, on September 26, 2011, DLA partially terminated the
contract for convenience, descoping two sites from the contract.234 DLA
then placed small orders for two of the remaining sites with delivery
deadlines of October 24, 2011.235 In response, Securiforce repeatedly
revised its projected delivery date into late November, well past the
deadline.236 Consequently, DLA issued Securiforce a show cause notice
seeking explanation for the delays or risk a default termination.237
Securiforce offered various purported government breaches as causes
for the delays, including the allegedly improper termination for
convenience, but gave no firm delivery date for the two orders.238
Without assurances that Securiforce would perform, DLA terminated
the contract for default on November 15, 2011.239
Nearly one year later, on November 6, 2012, Securiforce filed a
complaint with the Court of Federal Claims. Securiforce requested
declaratory relief that the termination for default was invalid and
that, due to its prior material breaches, the government could not
avail itself of the alternative remedy of termination for
convenience.240 Alternatively, Securiforce sought a declaration that
the default be converted to termination for convenience.241
On November 16, 2012, ten days after filing its complaint,
Securiforce sent a letter to the contracting officer requesting a final
decision that the termination for convenience was a material breach
of contract entitling Securiforce to damages.242 On January 16, 2013,
the contracting officer responded that Securiforce did not present a

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Securiforce Int’l Am., LLC v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 749, 754 (2016).
Id. at 756–57.
Id. at 760–61.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 762.
Id.
Securiforce Int’l Am., LLC v. United States, 879 F.3d 1354, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
See id. at 1359 (discussing Securiforce’s first amended complaint).
Securiforce Int’l Am., 125 Fed. Cl. at 768.
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cognizable claim because the letter “failed to state a sum certain and
it did not ‘make any reference to seeking an adjustment or
interpretation of the contract terms.’”243 The contracting officer also
indicated that Securiforce’s allegation of an improper termination
for convenience was “likely without merit.”244
Upon receipt of the contracting officer’s letter, Securiforce amended
its complaint to challenge the “deemed denial” of its November 16, 2012
request for final decision.245 Among other things, Securiforce requested
that the court “enter a declaratory judgment that the terminations were
invalid; that, due to its prior material breaches, and other breaches, the
government may not avail itself of its termination for convenience
remedy, either directly or as an alternative to its improper default; and
that Securiforce is entitled to breach damages.”246
Judge Horn held that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction
over both termination challenges under the CDA. She found that the
termination for convenience was improper, but that the termination
for default was proper.247 Securiforce appealed Judge Horn’s decision
on the default termination.
The government cross-appealed,
contending that the Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction over
Securiforce’s claim of entitlement to breach damages.248
2.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
In a unanimous opinion authored by Judge Dyk and joined by
Judges O’Malley and Wallach, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court
of Federal Claims’s ruling that the termination for default was
proper. But the Federal Circuit also held that the Court of Federal
Claims lacked jurisdiction over Securiforce’s challenge to the prior
termination for convenience because Securiforce failed to state a sum
certain in its November 2012 letter to the contracting officer.249
Consequently, the Federal Circuit vacated the Court of Federal
Claims’s entry of judgement with respect to the termination for
convenience and remanded with instructions to dismiss that claim.250

243. Id. at 762.
244. Id. at 762.
245. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 2, Securiforce Int’l Am.,
LLC v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 749, 2013 WL 358916 (2013) (No. 12-759C).
246. Id. at 14.
247. Securiforce Int’l Am., 125 Fed. Cl. at 754, 780–81, 799.
248. Securiforce Int’l Am., LLC v. United States, 879 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
249. Id. at 1361, 1368.
250. Id. at 1368.
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The Federal Circuit held that the contractor’s termination for
convenience challenge was a monetary claim, regardless of how it was
styled. The Federal Circuit also found that the contractor’s failure to
present or certify a “sum certain” to the contracting officer in its
letter seeking a final decision rendered the claim “insufficient” and
precluded jurisdiction because the Court of Federal Claims has
jurisdiction only over a contracting officer’s final decision on a valid
CDA claim.251 To determine whether the relief sought is monetary or
non-monetary, the Federal Circuit noted that it looks to the
substance of the pleadings, not the form. It explained that “[i]f ‘the
only significant consequence’ of the declaratory relief sought ‘would
be that [the plaintiff] would obtain monetary damages from the
federal government,’ the claim is in essence a monetary one.”252
The Federal Circuit concluded that Securiforce’s termination for
convenience challenge was a monetary claim. It observed that
Securiforce’s own November 2012 letter to the contracting officer
“asked the [contracting officer] to decide whether ‘Securiforce is
entitled to breach damages,’ without specifying an amount,”253 and
that, after the Court of Federal Claims ruled in Securiforce’s favor,
the contractor “sent an additional letter to the [contracting officer],
for the first time quantifying its damages as $47 million.”254
Consequently, “Securiforce’s failure to present this sum certain to the
[contracting officer] in its November 2012 letter rendered its claim
insufficient,” and left the Court of Federal Claims without jurisdiction

251. Id. at 1360. There is no “sum-certain” requirement in the CDA itself; that
requirement comes from the definition of claim in the FAR. See FAR 2.101 (defining
“claim” as a “written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties
seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain”). The Federal
Circuit has long treated the FAR’s definition of a claim as controlling for
determining when CDA jurisdiction exists. See Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d
1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). Treating the sum-certain and similar
requirements as jurisdictional prerequisites to CDA litigation is at least questionable
in light of recent Supreme Court precedent. See Nathaniel E. Castellano, After
Arbaugh: Neither Claim Submission, Certification, nor Timely Appeal are Jurisdictional
Prerequisites to Contract Disputes Act Litigation, 47 PUB. CONT. L.J. 35, 68 (2017)
(“Because claim submission is not jurisdictional, it follows that neither are any of the
judicially and administratively conjured elements of claim submission—e.g., the need
to demand a ‘sum-certain’ . . . .”).
252. Securiforce Int’l Am., 879 F.3d at 1360 (quoting Brazos Elec. Power Coop., Inc.
v. United States, 144 F.3d 784, 787 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
253. Id. at 1360–61.
254. Id. at 1361.
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to “entertain Securiforce’s declaratory judgment claim with respect to
the termination for convenience.”255
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the Tucker Act provides
the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over “some non-monetary
disputes,” but found that this statutory language “did not relieve
parties’ obligations to comply with the separate requirements of the
CDA, including the statement of a sum certain where, as here, the
party is in essence seeking monetary relief.”256 In addition, the court
observed that, even if Securiforce’s affirmative challenge to the
termination for convenience was “properly characterized as
nonmonetary,” the Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction to
entertain the claim because it has discretion to grant declaratory relief
only in “narrow circumstances,” such as “during contract performance.”
This includes when there is “‘a fundamental question of contract
interpretation or a special need for early resolution of a legal issue,’” but
only if the legal remedies available to the parties are not adequate.257
Based on the record, the Federal Circuit characterized
Securiforce’s termination for convenience challenge as epitomizing
“a circumstance where ‘the legal remedies . . . would be adequate to
protect [Securiforce’s] interests.’”258 The Federal Circuit reasoned that
“damages are always the default remedy for breach of contract,”259 and
thus, “[a] contractor’s request for declaratory judgment that the
government materially breached a contract by terminating for
convenience . . . would violate ‘the traditional rule that courts will not
grant equitable relief when money damages are adequate.’”260
The Federal Circuit’s opinion then addressed the Court of Federal
Claims’s jurisdiction to entertain the contractor’s affirmative defense of
prior material breach, including the improper termination for
convenience defense, to the default termination. The Federal Circuit
reasoned that the default termination was a government claim and that
the common law material breach defense did not require the payment
of money or an adjustment or interpretation of the contract terms.261
The Federal Circuit’s holding in Securiforce thus distinguishes between
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. (quoting Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. United States, 178 F.3d 1260, 1271
(Fed. Cir. 1999)).
258. Id. (quoting Alliant, 178 F.3d at 1271).
259. Id. at 1361–62.
260. Id. at 1362.
261. Id. at 1362–63.
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jurisdiction over claims used as “swords” to seek affirmative relief and
claims used as “shields” to defend against or negate a government claim.
The Federal Circuit explained that the rule articulated in M.
Maropakis Carpentry Co. v. United States262 applies only to those defenses
that “seek the payment of money or the adjustment or interpretation
of the contract terms.”263 In Maropakis, the Federal Circuit held that
contractors must comply with the CDA’s jurisdictional and
procedural prerequisites to assert an affirmative defense against a
government claim. The Federal Circuit thus clarified in Securiforce that
a contractor need not meet the CDA’s jurisdictional prerequisites to
assert an affirmative defense to the contract as written, including the
defense of prior material breach.264
Finding that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction to
entertain that defense, the Federal Circuit then turned to the merits
and determined that the government did not breach the contract by
partially terminating it for convenience, nor did the termination for
convenience amount to an abuse of discretion.265
B. Meridian Engineering Co. v. United States
1. Background
Meridian Engineering Co. v. United States266 involved a classic
construction contract dispute. In 2007, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers contracted with Meridian Engineering Company to
perform flood control work in relation to the Chula Vista Project.267
The project required Meridian to demolish and reconstruct a
highway bridge in Arizona by adding concrete flood channels and
relocating a sewer line.268
After contract formation and once performance was underway,
Meridian encountered “subsurface organic/unsuitable material” at
the job site, “specifically, ‘a layer of dripping saturated dark clay
262. 609 F.3d 1323, 1326–32 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
263. Securiforce Int’l Am., 879 F.3d at 1362 (citation omitted). For further
discussion of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Maropakis, see Schooner, supra note 10,
at 1095–99; Steven L. Schooner & Pamela J. Kovacs, Affirmatively Inefficient
Jurisprudence?: Confusing Contractors’ Rights to Raise Affirmative Defense with Sovereign
Immunity, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 685, 702 (2012).
264. Securiforce Int’l Am., 879 F.3d at 1362–63.
265. Id. at 1364, 1367.
266. 885 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
267. Id. at 1354.
268. Id.
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material under which a clean layer of sand is producing water’ that
had ‘the potential for serious structural damage.’”269 In response, the
Army modified the contract to provide increased funding, yet
subsequent structural failures eventually resulted in the government
suspending work and ultimately terminating the contract.270
Following failed negotiations as to termination costs, Meridian filed
a twelve-count complaint at the Court of Federal Claims.271 The
Court of Federal Claims denied the vast majority of Meridian’s
claims.272 On the question of whether Meridian was entitled to be
paid for certain work it completed, the court ordered Meridian to
provide the government with all relevant invoices and directed the
parties to attempt to negotiate a settlement.273
2.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
Meridian appealed, challenging the Court of Federal Claims’s
decision on several grounds.274 In an opinion authored by Judge
Wallach, joined by Judge Reyna and Chief Judge Prost, the Federal
Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part the
Court of Federal Claims’s decision.275
This long and complex decision affirms most of the Court of
Federal Claims’s conclusions and summarily denies many of
Meridian’s arguments presented on appeal. First, Meridian argued
that the Court of Federal Claims erred in analyzing Meridian’s claims
as “breach” claims instead of analyzing them “under the framework
contemplated by the CDA.”276 The Federal Circuit quickly dismissed
this argument, noting that “Meridian does not explain the alternate
CDA framework to which it refers, nor does it state how analysis
under a different hypothetical framework would result in a finding in
its favor.”277 The decision explains that “the CDA itself does not
provide a cause of action to which money damages may accrue; it is the
269. Id. (citations omitted).
270. Id.
271. See Meridian Eng’g Co. v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 381, 396–97 (2015)
(listing Meridian’s claims, including health hazards, flood events, unpaid contract
quantities, suspension of work, and channel fill).
272. Id. at 426.
273. See id. at 396–97, 414, 426 (describing the various work performed and the
associated reports provided to the government).
274. See generally Meridian, 885 F.3d at 1353–54.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1355.
277. Id.
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claim asserted pursuant to the CDA that is the source of potential
damages and review by the trier of fact.”278 Second, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’s findings that Meridian failed to
establish liability with respect to its differing site conditions claims.
Essentially, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Court of Federal Claims’s
findings that a reasonable contractor would have foreseen the site
conditions Meridian encountered.279 Third, Meridian challenged the
Court of Federal Claims’s decision to consolidate Meridian’s differing
site conditions claim with its separate claim that the government
provided defective specifications. The Federal Circuit agreed with the
lower court that the arguments were so intertwined as to effectively
constitute a single claim.280
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held in favor of Meridian with
respect to three issues, resulting in remand for further proceedings.
First, because Meridian and the government both agreed that the
Court of Federal Claims erred in determining when interest would
begin to accrue, the Federal Circuit remanded with instructions to
recalculate interest.281 Second, the Federal Circuit held that the
Court of Federal Claims provided insufficient analysis to support its
conclusion that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction precluded
Meridian’s claim seeking damages for government-caused delays that
forced Meridian to work in inclement weather.282 Specifically, the
Court of Federal Claims found accord and satisfaction without
adequately considering evidence presented by Meridian suggesting
that there was no “meeting of the minds” between the parties.283
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that the Court of Federal Claims
erred in its conclusion that the government had already paid
Meridian sufficiently to cover Meridian’s entitlement for certain
“unpaid contract quantities” based on the government’s right under
FAR 52.232-5 to withhold a percentage of progress payments if there
is a lack of “satisfactory progress.”284 Because there was no allegation
of unsatisfactory performance, the Federal Circuit held that the
government’s right to withhold under FAR 52.232-5 was

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id.
See id. at 1355–60.
Id. at 1360–61.
Id. at 1354 n.2.
See id. at 1362–65.
Id. at 1364 n.12.
See id. at 1365–67 (quoting FAR 52.232-5 (2018)).
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inapplicable.285 The Federal Circuit thus remanded for further
proceedings on the amount Meridian is entitled to recover for the
“unpaid contract quantities.”286
C. K-CON, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army
In K-Con, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army,287 the Federal Circuit held that
the mandatory bonding requirements at FAR 52.228-15 are subject to
the doctrine set forth in G.L. Christian and Associates v. United States288
and were thus automatically incorporated by operation of law into
two contracts for the construction of pre-engineered metal
buildings.289 The decision also highlighted the need for contractors
to seek clarification when faced with a potentially patent ambiguity as
to the type of acquisition being sought by the government.
1.

Background
In September 2013, the Army awarded K-Con, Inc. two contracts
for pre-engineered metal buildings at Camp Edwards,
Massachusetts.290 One contract was to design and construct a laundry
facility, and the other was to construct a communications equipment
shelter.291 The government issued both solicitations using Standard
Form 1449, Solicitation/Contract/Order for Commercial Items, and
neither solicitation mentioned performance and payment bond
requirements.292 A month after the contract award, the Army
requested that K-Con provide performance and payment bonds
pursuant to FAR 28.102-1, which “requires performance and payment
bonds for any construction contract exceeding $150,000.”293 K-Con
provided the required performance bonds and, in January 2016, sent
the Army a certified claim in the amount of $116,336.56 for the
increases in cost and labor.294
285. Id. at 1366.
286. Id. at 1366–67.
287. 908 F.3d 719 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
288. See G.L. Christian & Assoc. United States, 312 F.2d 418, 427 (Ct. Cl. 1963)
(holding that “it is both fitting and legally sound to read the termination article
required by the Procurement Regulations as necessarily applicable to the present
contract and therefore as incorporated into it by operation of law”).
289. K-Con, Inc., 908 F.3d at 727–28.
290. Id. at 721.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 721–22.
293. Id. at 722, 725 (quoting FAR 28.102-1(a) (2017)).
294. Id. at 722.
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The Contracting Officer for the Army rejected the requests on two
grounds. First, the Contracting Officer stated that the bonds were
mandatory because the contracts were for construction. Second, the
Contracting Officer asserted that the bond requirements were assumed
to be in the contract pursuant to the Christian doctrine.295 K-Con
appealed the Army’s decision to the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals, and the Board affirmed the Army’s denial of K-Con’s claim.296
2.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
K-Con appealed to the Federal Circuit and raised two arguments:
(1) the contracts were for commercial items instead of construction
and were thus not required to have the bond requirements; and (2)
even if the contracts were for construction, the Board erred in
holding that the bond requirements could be incorporated into the
contracts by operation of law pursuant to the Christian doctrine.297
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision on both
grounds.298 In an opinion authored by Judge Stoll and joined by
Judge Reyna and Senior Judge Bryson, the Federal Circuit held that
the contracts were patently ambiguous as to whether they were for
construction or commercial items, meaning that “the contract[s]
contain[ed] facially inconsistent provisions that would place a
reasonable contractor on notice and prompt the contractor to rectify
the inconsistency by inquiring of the appropriate parties.”299 K-Con
thus had a duty, at the outset, to inquire as to whether the contracts
were for construction or commercial items. K-Con’s failure to do so
precluded it from arguing that the contracts were for commercial items.300
The court reasoned that the ambiguity in the contracts was obvious because
they were issued using the standard commercial items contract form, while
the details in the contracts clearly referred to construction activities.301

295. Id.
296. Id. at 721, 722.
297. Id. at 722.
298. Id. at 727–28.
299. Id. at 722 (quoting Stratos Mobile Networks USA, LLC v. United States, 213
F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
300. See id. at 723 (“Because the solicitations contained contract language that was
patently ambiguous, K-Con cannot argue that its interpretation was proper unless KCon contemporaneously sought clarification of the language from the Army. K-Con
did not seek such clarification and therefore cannot now argue that the contracts
should be for commercial items.” (citation omitted)).
301. Id.
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The Federal Circuit also found that the Board did not err when it
applied the Christian doctrine to the performance and payment bond
requirements at FAR part 28.302 Under the Christian doctrine, a
contract clause will be incorporated by operation of law into a
government contract if: (1) the clause is mandatory under the FAR,
and (2) the clause “expresses a significant or deeply ingrained strand
of public procurement policy.”303 The Federal Circuit found that the
performance bond clauses were mandatory because they were
required by statute, namely, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3131–34, formerly known as the
Miller Act.304 The statute states that performance and payment bonds
“must” be furnished in construction contracts worth more than
$100,000.305 It was later implemented into the FAR and required that the
bond clauses be inserted into construction contracts and solicitations.306
K-Con contended that the clauses were not mandatory because the
Contracting Officer had the discretion to waive the bond
requirement.307 However, the Federal Circuit rejected this argument:
That the contracting officer could revise the bond requirements
does not change the fact that the bonding requirements are
mandatory for construction contracts over $150,000, like the
contracts here. Instead, the words “must” and “shall” in the
statutory and regulatory language establish that the requirement to
furnish performance and payment bonds is mandatory.308

With respect to the second prong of the Christian doctrine analysis,
the Federal Circuit discussed the legislative history of the Miller Act
and concluded that the bond requirements were “deeply ingrained”
in procurement policy.309
To start, it explained that since
government property cannot be subjected to subcontractors’ and
suppliers’ liens, payment bonds were created in government
contracts to provide an alternative remedy for those who supply labor
or materials to a contractor on a federal project.310 It also explained that
302. Id. at 725, 727.
303. Id. at 724 (citing Gen. Eng’g & Mach. Works v. O’Keefe, 991 F.2d 775, 779
(Fed. Cir. 1993)).
304. See id. at 724–25.
305. Id. (citing 40 U.S.C. § 3131(b) (2012)). The threshold has since been raised
to $150,000. FAR 28.102-1(a) (2017); see also K-Con, Inc., 908 F.3d at 724 n.4 (noting
that the regulation contains a higher threshold than the statute).
306. K-Con, Inc., 908 F.3d at 724–25.
307. Id. at 725.
308. Id. (citing Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1977 (2016)).
309. Id.
310. Id.
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performance bonds were made to ensure that federal contracts get
completed without additional costs in the event of a default.311 The
Miller Act expressly required these bonds to protect both of these
interests. Thus, the Federal Circuit found that the statute was “deeply
ingrained” in public policy.312
D. Agility Logistics Services Co. KSC v. Mattis
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Agility Logistics Services Co. KSC v.
Mattis313 holds that CDA jurisdiction does not extend to claims arising
under contracts formed with the Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA).314 This holding turns on the finding that the U.S. government
is not actually a contracting party to CPA contracts, even where task
orders under a CPA contract were issued and administered by a U.S.
agency and obligated U.S. funds.315
1.

Background
The United States and its coalition partners created the CPA in
2003 to govern Iraq while awaiting the constitution of a new Iraqi
government.316 Shortly thereafter, the CPA formed an umbrella contract
with Agility to establish and operate distribution center warehouses and
staging areas as part of a supply chain management system.317
Agility’s umbrella contract with the CPA stated that obligations
under the contract would be made with Iraqi funds, not the funds of
any coalition member country.318 The umbrella contract also
anticipated a transfer of authority from the CPA to an Iraqi Interim
Government, at which point the CPA would be dissolved.319 In doing
so, the umbrella contract disclaimed U.S. liability for performance
after the transfer: “The CPA, U.S. Government or Coalition

311. Id. at 725–26.
312. Id. at 726.
313. 887 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
314. Id. at 1145–46.
315. See generally Ralph C. Nash, Puzzling Decisions: Is Issuing Task Orders Contract
Administration?, 32 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 27 (June 2018) (noting that the Federal
Circuit found that the contracts were only “issued by” a government agency, not
“made by” the government).
316. Agility, 887 F.3d at 1146.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
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Government will not be liable to the contractor for any performance
undertaken after the [transfer of authority].”320
Once governing authority was transferred from the CPA to the
interim government, responsibility for administering CPA contracts
fell to the Project and Contracting Office, a temporary department
created within the U.S. Army that subsequently issued a series of task
orders to Agility under the CPA umbrella contract.321 Despite
language in the umbrella contract that all obligations under it would
be made with Iraqi funds, several of the task orders issued by the
Army in fact obligated U.S. funds.322
In 2010, a U.S. contracting officer issued final decisions claiming
over $81 million for alleged overpayments made to Agility during
performance of task orders under the CPA contract.323 Each
contracting officer decision contained standard CDA language
pertaining to a contractor’s right to appeal, and Agility appealed all
but one of the contracting officer’s decisions to the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals.324 Agility also submitted to the contracting
officer a claim of its own for $47 million in unpaid invoices submitted
under the CPA contract.325 The Contracting Officer denied Agility’s
claim, and Agility also appealed that denial to the Board.326
The government moved to dismiss Agility’s appeals for lack of
jurisdiction, and the Board granted the government’s motion.327 The
Board reasoned that its jurisdiction under the CDA extends only to
contracts made by executive agencies, and that “the CPA, created by a
coalition of nation states, is not a federal executive agency for
purposes of CDA jurisdiction.”328 Thus, absent evidence that the CPA
contract was novated or assigned to a U.S. executive agency, the
United States acted as a contract administrator, not a contracting
party, and the Board lacked jurisdiction.329

320. Id.
321. Id. at 1147.
322. See id. at 1146–47 (noting that the twelve task orders at issue in the case
obligated U.S. funds).
323. Id. at 1147–48.
324. Id. at 1148; Appeals of Agility Logistics Servs. Co. KSC, ASBCA No. 57415, 151 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 35840, 2014 WL 7260693 (Dec. 9, 2014).
325. Agility, 887 F.3d at 1148.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Appeals of Agility, ASBCA No. 57415, 15-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 35840.
329. Id.
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2.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
Agility appealed to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit affirmed
the Board decision in an opinion authored by Chief Judge Prost and
joined by Judges Lourie and Chen.330 As with the Board’s decision, the
Federal Circuit’s decision turned on the assertion that CDA
jurisdiction applies only to contracts made by an executive agency.331
In essence, the Federal Circuit declined to accept any argument
that the U.S. government’s actions administering the CPA contract,
however involved, could transform the U.S. government from a
contract administrator, or an agent of the CPA or its successors, into
a contracting party.332 According to the Federal Circuit, it was irrelevant
that the U.S. government issued and administered the task orders and
obligated U.S. funds. The Federal Circuit found “that even if an executive
agency issued the Task Orders, it did so as a contract administrator and
not as a contracting party.” The Federal Circuit thus concluded that “the
Task Orders were not ‘made by’” an executive agency.333
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit’s decision was driven by language in the
umbrella CPA contract expressly stating that the “U.S. Government . . . will
not be liable . . . for any performance undertaken after the” transfer of
authority from the CPA to the interim government.334
While unlikely to impact the vast majority of traditional CDA
claims, the Agility decision is critically important for any contractor
that entered into a contract with the CPA. Absent distinct contractual
provisions that may implicate U.S. government liability, or
subsequent novation to a U.S. executive agency, appeals brought
under the CDA from contracting officer decisions relating to CPA
contracts are likely to face motions to dismiss by the government.
III. OTHER TUCKER ACT JURISDICTION CASES
The Tucker Act of 1887 was passed by Congress to cement the
jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Claims—today, the Court of Federal
Claims—to adjudicate monetary claims against the U.S. government
based on the Constitution, statute or regulation, or “upon any

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Agility, 887 F.3d at 1145.
Id. at 1148–49.
See id. at 1149–51.
Id. at 1151.
Id.
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express or implied contract with the United States.”335 While most of
the contractual disputes heard by the Court of Federal Claims today
arise under the CDA,336 the court will sometimes be called upon to
resolve other claims against the government that fall outside the scope
of the CDA but are still based upon a “contract with the United States.”
A. Alpine PCS, Inc. v. United States
Alpine PCS, Inc. v. United States337 involves the scope of Tucker Act
jurisdiction, particularly 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), and the circumstances
under which that jurisdiction can be displaced by a separate,
comprehensive regulatory scheme.
In 1996, Alpine PCS, Inc. (Alpine), a small wireless
telecommunications company, contracted with the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to obtain two ten-year “personal
communication services” licenses in California.338 Alpine was to pay for
the licenses in installments during the ten-year period.339 In January
2002, Alpine failed to make payment, triggering a regulation that
provided Alpine three months to pay the amount in full plus late
fees.340 If the payment was not made, the license was to “automatically
cancel.”341 One week before the deadline, Alpine asked the FCC if it
could restructure the payment plan and waive the automatic
cancellation provision.342 Due to a change in the FCC’s database, the
licenses reverted back to the FCC.343 Alpine alleged that the FCC
assured them that the reversion was a clerical error.344
In January 2007, the FCC denied both of Alpine’s requests to
restructure, causing Alpine to default.345 Alpine filed a petition for
reconsideration with the FCC.346 While the petition was pending, the
335. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012)); see
also Swan, supra note 3, at 108 (noting that the Tucker Act constitutes “the bedrock waiver
of sovereign immunity for claims founded upon contracts with the United States”).
336. The Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to hear CDA claims pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2).
337. 878 F.3d 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
338. Id. at 1088–89.
339. Id. at 1089.
340. Id. at 1090 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(g)(4)(i)–(ii) (2000)).
341. Id. (quoting § 1.2110(g)(iii)–(iv)).
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
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FCC announced a new auction offering the cancelled licenses.347
Alpine asked the FCC to stay the auction until a decision was made on
the petition, but the FCC refused.348 In 2008, Alpine filed for
bankruptcy.349 In 2010, Alpine appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, which ultimately affirmed the FCC’s decision.350
In 2013, Alpine brought another suit in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia alleging various theories of breach of
contract.351 The District Court dismissed Alpine’s claim for lack of
jurisdiction on the basis that, pursuant to the regulatory regime
created by the Federal Communications Act,352 only the D.C. Circuit
could hear Alpine’s claim against the FCC. The D.C. Circuit affirmed
this jurisdictional ruling.353
On January 4, 2016, Alpine brought another suit against the FCC—
this time in the Court of Federal Claims—alleging that the FCC
breached the contracts by unilaterally placing Alpine in default on
the licenses, and the FCC’s cancellation of the licenses constituted a
taking under the Fifth Amendment.354 Court of Federal Claims Judge
Lettow dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.355 He explained that the
“specific and comprehensive” statutory scheme within the Federal
Communications Act preempted the Court of Federal Claims’s
jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.356 As for the takings claim, he found
that the claim accrued when the licenses were re-auctioned, and thus were
barred by the Tucker Act’s six-year jurisdictional statute of limitations.357
Alpine appealed to the Federal Circuit.358 In an unanimous
decision authored by Judge Taranto and joined by Judges Moore and
Reyna, the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Alpine’s case for
lack of jurisdiction.359 The Federal Circuit framed the issue as whether

347. Id. at 1090–91.
348. Id. at 1091.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. See id. (listing Alpine’s claims against the FCC for “breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, fraud in the inducement, and breach of fiduciary duty”).
352. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151–624 (2012)).
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Alpine PCS, Inc. v. United States, 128 Fed. Cl. 303, 307–09 (2016).
356. Id. at 307.
357. Id. at 309.
358. See generally Alpine PCS, Inc. v. United States, 878 F.3d 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
359. Id. at 1088.
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Tucker Act jurisdiction was displaced by the Federal Communication
Act’s specific and comprehensive regulatory scheme.360 Alpine argued
that it was challenging the “breach of a contract that resulted in
forfeiture of [the] licenses” and not the revocation of its licenses, but
the Federal Circuit found, “[t]hat distinction is an empty one.”361 The
Federal Circuit held that the Federal Communications Act displaces
the Tucker Act by providing Alpine a comprehensive vehicle to obtain
an administrative and judicial remedy for its breach of contract claims,
noting that Alpine had already taken advantage of that remedial
scheme in 2002 and 2010.362
B. Lee v. United States
363

involved a class action claim against the
Lee v. United States
government alleging breach of a non-procurement contract.364 The
decision demonstrated the difficulties of recovering under breach of
implied contract theories where an express contract already exists.
The plaintiffs in the class action lawsuit were hired by the
government through individual purchase order vendor (POV)
contracts to provide services to Voice of America, a governmentfunded broadcast service.365 The plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of
Federal Claims, alleging that the government breached their POV
contracts by failing to provide them with the salary and benefits
appropriate for federal employees or personal service contractors.366 The
plaintiffs sought damages under three theories: (1) breach of express
contract, (2) breach of implied-in-fact contract, and (3) quantum meruit.367
360. Id. at 1093 (“In Folden, we examined in detail the [Federal] Communication
Act’s ‘comprehensive statutory and regulatory regime governing orders of the
[FCC],’ including the remedial scheme of administrative review under 47 U.S.C.
§ 155 and judicial enforcement and review under §§ 401–02. We held that the
comprehensive scheme displaces Tucker Act jurisdiction for, inter alia, FCC decisions
and orders falling within 47 U.S.C. § 402(b). Here, the key question is whether
Alpine’s contract claims fall within § 402(b). That subsection provides for appeals to
the D.C. Circuit of FCC ‘decisions and orders’ ‘[b]y the holder of any . . . station
license which has been . . . revoked by the [FCC].’ Alpine’s contract claims, which
challenge the validity of the FCC’s cancellation and revocation of its station licenses,
fall squarely within that provision.”).
361. Id. at 1094.
362. Id. at 1094, 1097–98.
363. 895 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
364. Id. at 1365.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 1365–66.
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Judge Lettow of the Court of Federal Claims dismissed the case and
declined to allow the plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint
on the basis that doing so would be futile.368 The Federal Circuit
affirmed in a unanimous decision authored by Senior Judge Bryson
and joined by Judges Reyna and Stoll.369
With respect to the breach of express contract theory, the plaintiffs
argued that, although the government treated the plaintiffs as
employees or personal service contractors during performance of the
contracts, the government failed to provide the salary and benefits to
which federal employees and personal service contractors are
entitled. The Federal Circuit rejected this theory, noting that the
plaintiffs’ contracts stated that the plaintiffs were independent
contractors and did not suggest that the government was obligated to
provide the wages or benefits owed to federal employees or personal
service contractors. The Federal Circuit noted that “the plaintiffs
fail[ed] to identify any specific provision of the representative
contracts that was breached; instead, they relied on general
allegations regarding the rights normally enjoyed by independent
contractors.”370 The Federal Circuit thus concluded that the plaintiffs
“failed to state a claim for breach of express contract” because their
allegations were “not tied to the rights and obligations of the parties
defined by the contracts.”371
The Federal Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that the
government breached an implied-in-fact contract to compensate them
as federal employees or personal service contractors. It held that an
implied-in-fact contract could not exist because the plaintiffs already
had an express contract that covered the same subject matter.372
The plaintiffs attempted to save their implied contract claim by
arguing that the express contracts were void because they violated FAR
37.104,373 which only allows the government to award personal service
contracts if they are specifically permitted under law.374 The Federal
Circuit rejected this argument as well. It concluded that the contracts
did not violate FAR 37.104, and explained that, even if the contracts

368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Lee v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 734, 736–37 (2016).
Lee, 895 F.3d at 1365.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1368, 1369.
Id. at 1370–73.
FAR 37.104(a) (2017).
Lee, 895 F.3d at 1370–71 (citing FAR 37.104).
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did violate the FAR, such a violation itself is not sufficient to justify the
extraordinary act of retroactively voiding a government contract.375
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ claim for
recovery under a theory of quantum meruit. The Federal Circuit
explained that the Tucker Act generally does not provide jurisdiction
over claims of quantum meruit, and the court held that a quantum
meruit exception was insufficient to overcome the presumption
against jurisdiction when the underlying implied-in-fact contract
claim could not survive a motion to dismiss.376
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s government contracts decisions in 2018 were
few but potent. The court broke new ground by examining, for the
first time, the government’s obligation under FASA to consider
commercial sources; considered a follow-on issue related to the
Supreme Court’s Kingdomware decision; and continued to struggle
with the consequences of its 2010 decision in Maropakis. Many—
although certainly not all—of the court’s decisions this year were
consistent with the Federal Circuit’s strict constructionist approach to
statutory and contractual interpretation.
This year’s decisions
continue to demonstrate the court’s lack of specialized expertise in
the area of government contracts and the importance of having
advocates provide sufficient context surrounding the issues on appeal
to enable the court to come to a fully informed decision.

375. Id. at 1372.
376. Id. at 1373–74.

